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Summary  findings
Like other financial institutions, private pension funds  nondiscrimination provisions, regulations on fees and
require a panoply of prudential and protective  commissions, investment limits, minimum profitability
regulations to ensure their soundness and safeguard the  rules, and state guarantees.
interests of affiliated workers. These regulations include  Vittas d'iscusses  the use of such regulations in
authorization criteria (such as minimum capital, "fit and  developing countries that have implemented systemic
proper," and business plan requirements), asset  pension reforms. He draws a distinction between this
segregation and external custody, professional asset  approach and the more relaxed regulatory regime that
management, external audits and actuarial reviews,  relies on the "prudent person" rule found in more
extensive information disclosure, and effective  advanced countries. He argues that the "draconian"
supervision. These regulations resemble those applied to  regulatory approach can be justified on several grounds,
banks and insurance companies and are not particularly  but especially by the compulsory nature of the pension
controversial.  system, the absence of strong and transparent  capital
But private pension funds in developing countries are  markets, and the lack of a long tradition of private
often subject to structural and operational controls that  pension funds. But the regulations should be
are more controversial. Such controls include special  progressively relaxed as private pension funds and their
authorizations and market segmentation, "one account  affiliated workers gain in experience, sophistication, and
per worker"  and "one fund per company" rules,  maturity.
This paper-a  product of the Development Research Group-is  part of a larger effort in the group to study pension funds
and institutional investors. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington,
DC 20433. Please  contact Paulina Sintim-Aboagye,  room MC3 -422, telephone 202-473-8526, fax 202-522-1  '55, Internet
address psintimaboagye@worldbank.org. March 1998. (37 pages)
The Policy  Researcb  Vorking  Paper  Series  dissemiby  ates the findings  of work in psi-gress  to encourage  the excange of ideas  about
development  issutes.  An objective  of the series  is to  get the  findings  out quickly,  even if the  presentations  are  less  than  fully polished.  The
papers  carry  the names  of  the authors  and should  be cited  accordingly.  The findings,  interpretations,  and coniclusions  expressed  in this
paper  are entirely  those  of  the authors.  They do not necessarily  represent  the view of the World  Bank,  its Executive  Directors,  or the
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This is a  revised version of a  paper  presented  at the  conference on  "Pension
Systems:  From  Crisis  to  Reform"  organized  by  the  Economic Development
Institute on November 21 and 22, 1996. I am indebted to Diane Cashman, Estelle
James, David Lindeman, Donald Mclsaac, Monika Queisser, Richard Hinz, and
Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel  for insightful comments.I.  INTRODUCTION
This paper discusses some important regulatory issues facing private pension funds.  No
attempt is made to be comprehensive and exhaustive or to develop a theory of pension fund
regulation. As implied by its title, the paper is selective and focuses on issues that are often the
subject of controversial debate.  These issues can be classified into three groups: those
determining the conceptual framework within which private pension funds operate; those that
aiffect  the structure and contestability of the sector; and those dealing with investment, valuation
and minimum profitability rules and state guarantees.
The noncontroversial, or at least less controversial, regulatory issues tend to be of a
prudential and protective nature.  They aim to ensure the financial soundness of private pension
fmnds  and safeguard the interests of workers and resemble in many respects those that would be
emphasized for sound banks and insurance companies. They include rules regarding
authorization criteria, capital adequacy, asset segregation, professional asset management, use of
custodial services, actuarial reviews, external audits, information disclosure, and effective
supervision.
Although less controversial, prudential and protective regulations are more important
because they are arguably indispensable for the good functioning of private pension funds.
External custody, for instance, is crucial for protecting pension fund members from outright theft
by asset managers or pension plan sponsors.  Effective external custody eliminates the risk of
asset managers absconding with the money to difficult to reach exotic places or the risk of plan
sponsors using pension fund assets as collateral for their own financial operations.  Similar
considerations apply to the other prudential and protective regulations listed above.
The controversial regulations attract more attention and debate, but they are less
important because the use of one or other approach may depend on the conditions prevailing in
particular countries.  This paper draws a basic distinction between what may be called a
"relaxed" regulatory regime that would appear more appropriate for countries with well
developed capital markets and a long tradition of private pension funds and a "draconian"
regulatory regime that would appear more suitable for countries that have underdeveloped capital
markets and no or little tradition in operating private pension funds.  Both types of regimes
would need to be supported by a whole panoply of prudential and protective regulations that
mimic to a large extent similar rules applied on banks and insurance companies.
II.  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The conceptual framework governing the operations of private pension funds is
determined by five main issues: the philosophy of regulation; the nature of the mandate; the
nature of the benefit; the degree of individual choice; and the tax treatment.  Three of these
1aspects--  the philosophy  of regulation,  the nature  of the mandate,  and the degree  of individual
choice--  interact  extensively  in shaping  the conceptual  framework. The nature  of the benefit,  i.e.
whether  pension  funds are based  on defined  contribution  (DC)  or defined  benefit (DB)  plans,  has
important  operational  and regulatory  implications,  but less extensive  interaction  with the other
three issues. Similarly,  the tax treatment  of pension  funds  has incentive  effects  and fiscal cost
implications  as well as redistributive  repercussions,  but limited  interaction  with other regulatory
issues.
2.1  PHILOSOPHY OF REGULATION
The basic  philosophy  of regulation  is clearly  a major determinant  of the regulatory
framework  governing  the operations  of private  pension  funds in different  countries. Four
approaches  may  be distinguished,  although  in reality  most countries  follow  a mixture  of two or
more of them.
At one end, there may be centralized  management  by aL  public  agency,  such  as a social
security  institution  or a national  provident  fund. Depending  on how  they are organized  and
structured,  these institutions  may centralize  all aspects  of administration  and investment  and may
leave  little scope  for the emergence  of private  pension  funds. The social  security  institutions  of
former  socialist  countries  in Eastern  Europe  and Central  Asia as well as the national  provident
funds  in Singapore  and Malaysia  probably  came  closest  to this extreme  in the sense  that they
almost  precluded  the creation  of private  pension  funds.'
At the other  extreme,  private  pension  funds  may operate  in a regulatory  vacuum. This is
usually  the case  at the early stages  of their development.  It characterized,  for instance,  the
situation  in Europe  and North America  in the late 19th  and early 20th centuries 2 and is now
found in some  developing  and transitional  countries  ( e.g. Russia  where  several  hundred  pension
funds  have been  established  on the basis of rudimentary  legislation  and with no effective
supervision).
In between  these  two extremes,  there are two types  of regulatory  philosophies:
"draconian"  regulation  covering  most aspects  of their operation,  as is the case  in Chile and other
The  situation  has  changed  significantly  in both  regions  in recent  years.  In Singapore  and  Malaysia,
individual  workers  have  been allowed  to direct  the investment  of balances  in excess  of a specified  minimum  level,
while in Eastern  Europe  and Central  Asia  the monopoly  of social  security  institutions  has been  broken,  either  by
legislation  or by their failure  to collect  contributions  and  disburse  benefits,  and subsequent  emergence  of private
pension  funds.
2  For a review  of the historical  evolution  of private  pension  funds in the United  Kingdom  and the United
States,  see respectively  Hannah  (1986)  and Williamson  (1997).
2Latin American countries, 3 or reliance on the so-called "prudent man" or (in more modem and
politically correct parlance) "prudent person" approach but with extensive investor protection
rules, as has long been the case in Anglo-American countries and is now increasingly spreading
in other OECD countries.
The exact meaning and practical implications of the concept of the "prudent person" are
difficult to pin down. The concept is vague and subject to changes in fashion and fiduciary
norms, but it is also flexible and evolving in practice in response to changes in technology,
information availability, and market opportunities. 4
Draconian regulations are more appropriate for mandatory systems that are newly created
in countries with shallow and dysfunctional financial systems and little tradition of private
pension funds. In contrast, the "prudent person" approach may reflect the voluntary and gradual
expansion of private pension funds in countries with more sophisticated and better developed
financial systems.
In Chile, the draconian regulations, especially those on investment policies, could be
justified on several grounds: first and foremost, by the compulsory nature of the pension system;
second, the absence of strong and transparent capital markets; third, the lack of a long tradition of
private pension funds; fourth, the lack of familiarity of large numbers of workers with capital
market instruments; fifth, the need to provide safeguards to covered workers; sixth, the
concomitant need to control moral hazard, i.e. a situation where asset managers take excessive
risks in the knowledge that retiring workers will be covered by state guarantees; seventh the
need to reassure workers and overcome opposition to the program of systemic pension reform;
and eighth, the paramount importance of avoiding failures and nasty surprises and thus
undermining support for the reform program.  Many of these justifications are likely to become
less relevant over time as the reform takes roots and gains public acceptance, as capital markets
become deeper and more robust, and as workers become financially more sophisticated. The
need for draconian regulations would then weaken and a more relaxed approach could be
gradually adopted.
3  The aptness  of the term "draconian"  depends  on one's  perspective.  Seen from  the perspective  of London  or
New York,  the Chilean  regulatory  regime  for private  pension  funds  looks  quite  heavy and "draconian".  But seen
from the perspective  of developing  countries  that have  long  suffered  from financial  repression,  the Chilean
regulatory  regime  appears  less "draconian".  For instance,  no minimumn  requirements  have  been imposed  on the
investment  allocations  of pension  funds. This  was a major  departure  from  the use of directed  credits  and prescribed
investments  that characterized  most developing  and several  developed  countries  in the 1960s  and 1970s.
4  The evolution  of the concept  and  recent  criticism  are discussed  below  in section  4.1.
3Developing countries with underdeveloped and nontransparent financial systems would
do well to imitate Chile and adopt a draconian regulatory regimne  when they first introduce a
system of mandatory private pension funds. But they should also follow Chile's example in
relaxing the severity of regulations when market conditions improve (Bustamante 1996). For
countries with well developed capital markets and a long tradition of voluntary private pension
funds, the application of draconian regulations would appear umnecessary,  excessively
bureaucratic, and inefficient.
2.2  NATURE OF MANDATE
Another important determinant of the regulatory framework of private pension funds
regards the existence and nature of the mandate. Are private pension funds voluntary or
mandatory? And if the latter, is the mandate imposed on employers, as has been the case in
Switzerland and more recently Australia and Hong Kong, requairing  them to establish a pension
scheme for their employees?  Or is it imposed on individual viorkers as is increasingly the case in
Latin America, where new reforming countries appear to follow the precedent set by Chile?
A mandatory system may be premised on two grounds. First, to protect society from the
"weak moral hazard" of those who do not provide for their old age because they anticipate that
society will take care of them.  And, second, to protect workers, or at least a substantial minority
of them, from their own "myopic" behavior and failure to save for their old age.5
If a mandatory system is deemed appropriate, the question arises on who should be the
subject of the mandate.  An employer mandate seems to be a natural evolution from voluntary
company-based occupational pension schemes, which probably explains the choice made by
6  7  ~~~~~~~~~8 Switzerland', Australia  and Hong Kong.  With an employer mandate, large companies create
5  Although  there is growing  international  support  for compulsory  private  pillars,  either  as an alternative  to
payroll-tax-financed  social  security  systems  or as an important  component  of a multi-pillar  system,  a recent
referendum  in New  Zealand  voted 13-to-I  against  the introduction  of a compulsory  retirement  savings  scheme. The
existence  of a generous  tax-financed  universal  pension,  the absence  of any tax incentives,  and concerns  about high
operating  costs  probably  lie behind  this unfavorable  verdict. The New  Zealand  experience  underscores  the
importance  of initial  conditions  in generating  broad  political  and  public  support  for a compulsory  savings  scheme
(for  details  of the proposed  scheme  see  New Zealand  Government  1997).
6  In Switzerland,  the compulsory  private  pillar  was approved  in a 1972  referendum  essentially  as a defense
against  the expansion  of the highly  redistributive  public  pillar (Helbling  1991). It took  the Swiss  experts  and
authorities  13  years  to approve  the structure  and conditions  of the second  pillar. The new system  was introduced  in
1985  and allowed  the continuation  of pre-existing  voluntary  occupational  pension  plans provided  they  met the
minimum  conditions  established  under  the new law.
7  In Australia,  the compulsory  system  that was introduced  in 1992  originated  in  the use during  the late
1980s  of productivity  awards  for  boosting  retirement  savings  (Harris 1997,  Bateman  and Piggott  1996). Trade
unions  play an important  part in industry-wide  funds but corporate  plans continue  to have a significant  share of the
4and run in-house pension schemes, but small firms tend to rely on financial institutions (mostly
insurance companies) to run their pension schemes.
A worker mandate is closer in concept to the use of long-term mutual funds.  Its adoption
in Latin American countries mainly reflects the underdevelopment of company-based schemes
rather than any predilection in favor of mutual funds. A desire to emphasize personal
responsibility was probably an additional factor in explaining the choice made in Chile in the
early 1980s (Pinera 1991).
Employer and worker mandates have their advantages and disadvantages which are
probably not independent of the way in which they are regulated. Employer mandates generally
tend to involve fewer marketing and selling costs and should have lower operating costs than
wiorker  mandates.  But employer mandates tend also to be less transparent and may be associated
with lower investment returns, though empirical evidence on this as well as on operating costs is
not yet very clear.
Using hybrid mandates may overcome some of these problems and may combine high
returns with low costs. Although there is a possibility, at least in theory, that hybrid mandates
mnight  result in low returns and high costs, it is difficult to see the process that would bring about
such a result.
Hybrid mandates may come in three forms.  Under one approach, an employer mandate
may be imposed but with individual workers having the right to opt out of the employer-
sponsored scheme and join one of the independent funds, set up by financial institutions or other
groups. If this hybrid approach is adopted, employers should not be allowed to discriminate in
aniy  way against "opting out" workers, but the workers themselves would have to base their
decision on whether the uncertain prospect of possibly higher investment returns under a non-
employer scheme would outweigh the near certainty of higher operating costs (since large
employer schemes are likely to benefit from economies of scale and group discounts).  A hybrid
regime of this kind is currently contemplated in Australia and is even under early consideration
market. The  new law encourages  the creation  of open funds  and allows  the conversion  of existing  industry  or
corporate  funds into open  ones.
8  Hong Kong passed  legislation  creating  mandatory  provident  funds in  August 1995. However,  the new
system  has not been  established  yet because  of delays  in passing  the necessary  implementing  regulations. The new
system  places  a central  role on corporate  plans,  although  open funds, especially  for employees  of smaller  firms,  are
also  envisaged. The  mandatory  decentralized  provident  fund  approach  was adopted  despite  considerable  skepticism
and opposition,  but it was chosen  over  an alternative  proposal  to set up a defined  benefit  social  security  system
(Hong  Kong Government  1994,  Wong 1994).
5in Switzerland.  The right to opt-out is already conferred on employees in the United Kingdom,
even though the private pillar is not compulsory.
The second hybrid approach, which has been proposed for Chile, would involve a worker
mandate but with a provision for group contracts that would allow for group discounts and lower
operating costs.  Group contracts are likely to be arranged by employers but groups organized on
some other basis could also be envisaged.  An affiliate who is not happy with the performance of
a group contract would be free to leave the group and join the same or another fund on an
individual basis.  The higher operating costs of individual contracts would imply that few
workers would opt out of group contracts, but having such a iight would exert pressure on group
funds to perform well and achieve satisfactory net investmenl,  returns.
The three countries of Eastern Europe and Central AsiLa  (Hungary, Kazakstan and Poland)
that have enacted legislation for systemic pension reform during 1997 seem to have adopted a
third hybrid approach: imposing the mandate on workers but allowing companies to establish
closed corporate pension plans for their workers.  These would operate alongside open funds
operated by financial institutions.
The three hybrid approaches would have different staiting points but would otherwise
represent a convergence toward a structure that allows for scale economies and group discounts
while protecting the rights of individual workers.  However, hybrid mandates have yet to be
widely tested in practice.  In the case of workers of small firms, the right to opt out of the
company scheme or group contract might not be exercisable if it were to lead to a loss of job.
2.3  NATURE OF THE BENEFIT
The regulatory regime of private pension funds also depends on the nature of the benefit
that pension funds provide. Pension funds are traditionally classified between defined
contribution (DC) and defined benefit (DB) plans.  Their regulatory implications are quite
distinct and derive from the operating characteristics of each type of plan.
In DC plans, regular contributions are made by or on behalf of participating workers and
final benefits depend on the total contributions made and the accumulated investment earnings.
In contrast, in DB plans, participating workers are promised a certain level of benefits, based on
years of service, an annual rate of benefit (accrual rate), and a. reference salary. Participating
workers usually make regular contributions on a pre-determined basis, while sponsoring
employers adjust their contributions in the light of investment performance and other factors.
DC plans usually offer fully funded, fully vested and Bully  portable benefits based on
individual capitalization accounts, although Sweden and other countries have recently introduced
pension systems based on unfunded DC plans involving notional accounts and notional rates of
6return. For their part, DB plans may be operated on a funded or unfunded basis, but because the
present value of their benefits depends on complicated actuarial assumptions, it is difficult for
DB plans to offer fully funded, fully vested and especially fully portable benefits.
It is usually argued that DC plans involve a stronger link between contributions and
benefits than DB plans.  This is generally true when they are compared with DB plans based on
final salaries, minimum benefits, and early retirement with no actuarial adjustments, but not
necessarily so when they are compared with properly designed DB plans that are based on
lifetime earnings and actuarially adjusted early or late retirement.  This is because in DC plans
the largest component of the accumulated capital at retirement may well be the investment
income earned over the active life of a worker.  Variations in investment returns over time as
well as among different groups of workers may substantially weaken the link between
contributions and benefits.
In both types of plans, benefits may take the form of lump sum payments and/or regular
monthly income.  Historically, lump sum payments were offered by provident funds and regular
monthly income by pension funds, but increasingly this historical distinction has disappeared and
both provident and pension funds now offer a varying mix of both types of benefits. In DB
plans, the monthly pension is paid by the sponsoring employer through the foundation or trust
established to operate the pension fund.  In mandatory DC plans, retiring workers are required to
purchase a life annuity of one form or another from an insurance company or to use scheduled
withdrawals that are set annually by taking into account the life expectancy of retiring workers
and their dependents.
In mandatory DC plans, workers are often also required to purchase term life and
diisability  insurance in order to cover them and their dependents from accident or death prior to
reaching retirement age.  These insured benefits do not depend on the contributions (premiums)
paid by covered workers but are related to the salary earned prior to the occurrence of the
incident that led to their activation.  They are therefore of a defined benefit nature and highlight
thie  hybrid nature of pension arrangements involving elements of both DC and DB plans.
At this juncture, it is worth pointing out that, though widely used, the distinction between
DC and DB plans is not very useful.  In the first place, most DB plans suffer from more or less
frequent changes in their benefit formulas, involving changes in normnal  retirement ages, in early
retirement provisions, and in annual accrual factors (Luzadis and Mitchell 1991). If account is
also taken of the frequent failure to index pension payments to inflation on a consistent basis, it
could easily be argued that there is little that is defined or predetermined in a DB plan.9
This critique  also  applies  (and  perhaps  with  even greater  force)  to social  security  systems  (World  Bank
1994).
7In a similar vain, contributions need not be fixed or predetermined in a DC plan.  Since
investment income is the major component of the accumulatedl  capital at retirement, workers may
be allowed or even encouraged to adjust from time to time their contribution rates in the light of
the investment performnance  of their plans.  If variable contribuition  rates are periodically set with
a view to attaining desirable target replacement rates and if real or variable rather than nominal
annuities are purchased, DC plans may in fact be more successful in achieving predetermined
levels of pension benefits than DB plans.
A better basis for classification is perhaps a distinction between individual and collective
capitalization plans.  The first type of plan involves less risk pooling (some risk pooling takes
place through investment in mutual funds), but is based on more clearly defined and more
transparent contracts.  The second type involves extensive risk pooling but its contractual basis is
more complicated and less transparent.
In individual capitalization plans, workers assume the performance risk of the fund,
which may be subdivided into an investment risk, replacement or shortfall risk, and inflation risk
depending on how the contract is specified.  They also assume the solvency risk of the
management company, unless there is a  guarantee fund operated by the government or the
association of management companies.  Many of the regulations imposed on individual
capitalization plans have to do with mitigating the risk exposure of individual workers.
In collective capitalization plans, the performance risk is in principle assumed by the
sponsoring employer (and by insurance companies in the case of life policies or fixed annuities),
but workers assume the integrity and solvency risk of the sponsors of the collective capitalization
plans.  The provision of some kind of retirement income insurance is a basic rationale for the
existence of occupational pension plans (Bodie 1990), but the value of pension benefits depends
on whether workers continue to work for the same employer, itheir  earnings keep pace with
inflation, and the sponsoring employer maintains the same plan (Bodie and Mitchell 1996).
Many of the regulations imposed on collective capitalization plans have to do with clarifying the
underlying contractual arrangements and safeguarding the interests of workers.
2.4  DEGREE OF INDIVIDUAL CHOICE
The degree of individual choice has an important bearing on the scope and severity of
pension fund regulations.  Voluntary saving for retirement and voluntary participation in pension
funds, with or without tax incentives, imposes less of a regulatory burden on government than a
compulsory scheme. With mandatory schemes, governments have an obligation to ensure that
pension plans are safe, simple and easy to understand, and work well.  This obligation is clearly
stronger in countries where the system affects millions of workers lacking familiarity with
modem financial markets.
8Centralized management avoids many of the regulatory issues facing competitive
decentralized systems but it eliminates any individual choice and competitive pressure and thus
tends to suffer from inefficiency and high explicit or implicit taxes.  Company pension schemes
based on employer mandates also allow very little, if any, individual choice of pension fund or
pension scheme unless they are set up as hybrid mandates with the right of workers to opt out of
company plans and join independent funds. However, company pension schemes are
increasingly allowing limited choice of investment fund.
In contrast, in worker mandates, the right to choose and to change pension fund
management company is an integral element of the system. In principle, it increases the personal
responsibility of workers and stimulates competition, innovation and efficiency.  In practice,
however, account switching seems to have reached unexpectedly high levels and to be motivated
and manipulated by the interests of selling agents rather than the interests of workers.10
But even with individual choice of pension fund, some workers may object to investing in
heavily regulated pension funds and miss the opportunity to take greater risks and achieve higher
returns.  One way to accommodate such concerns would be to allow individual workers to invest
in pension funds that are less heavily regulated (especially subject to fewer and less draconian
investment rules), provided they would not be covered by government safeguards and
guarantees, other than broadly available investor protection rules.  Thus, workers who value the
government safeguards and guarantees would stay with the heavily regulated funds, while those
who do not desire such protections could opt for less regulated funds.
Offering this option may expose the authorities to adverse selection, moral hazard and
fiscal costs if the withdrawal of government safeguards from workers choosing the less regulated
funds is not credible.  This implies that countries where such a separation may not be credible
should not offer this option. In line with the approach followed in this paper, this option should
not be offered in countries that need to start with a draconian regulatory regime.  However,
offering such an option could be part of the process of relaxation of pension fund regulations.
A more controversial option would be to exempt workers with strong philosophical
objections against compulsory saving for retirement from participating in such schemes,
provided they sign a declaration to that effect.  At the very least, opting not to participate in a
compulsory scheme would be the result of a conscious decision. It would eliminate the "weak
moral hazard" whereby those who fail to save expect society to cater for them when they reach
1°  Account  switching  has  become  a major  issue in Chile  where  in 1996  nearly  1 in 3 of all affiliates,  and I in
2 of active  contributors  switched  their account. In Argentina,  in fiscal 1997,  ending  in June 1997,  and after only
thLree  years of operation, account switching reached 33% of active contributors and 17% of all affiliates.  The
reasons for this excessive level of switching are hotly debated (see below).
9old age. Young workers could still be influenced by "saving myopia", but if they have to sign
such a declaration every three or five years, they could realize the need for saving for their
retirement at an earlier stage than would otherwise be the case. This option would also be faced
with adverse selection, moral hazard, and potential fiscal costs in the long run, but it could take
care of workers who have strong objections to being mandated to save for retirement and thus
reduce opposition to systemic pension reform.  To protect the government from potential fiscal
costs, exercise of the option could be made dependent on the availability of adequate resources."
The degree of individual choice is also linked to the coverage issue.  In most countries,
self-employed workers are required to participate in social security systems with redistributive
objectives but not in supplementary capitalization schemes. However, self employed workers are
offered tax incentives to establish voluntary pension plans.  This is the case in Switzerland and
Australia (although Australia does not operate a social securily system but offers a tax-financed
but means-tested declining old age pension).  Among countries with mandatory supplementary
pillars, Argentina obliges self-employed workers to participate fully (though compliance and
verification of earnings are major problems), while Hong Kong will require contributions at half
the rate imposed on workers on employees.  12
Other groups of workers that could be exempted from compulsory participation are young
workers (say those below 25), workers with very low incomes, and older workers above the
normal retirement age. Switzerland (it its compulsory secondL  pillar) and the Netherlands (in
plans imposed by collective agreements) exempt young workers, while several countries exempt
earnings below 20% to 40% of the average.  As most young workers have low earnings, they
would tend to be exempt under these provisions.  Switzerland.  imposes contributions for the
private second pillar on the so-called "coordinated earnings" which are usually defined between
40% and 120% of the average wage.  Thus, earnings below 40% of the average wage are not
subject to second pillar contributions.'3 In Australia, the threshold was raised in 1997 from 15%
to 30% of average earnings, while in the proposed scheme for New Zealand noninvestment
income up to about 20% of the average net wage would have been exempt.  No such exemptions
apply in Chile, Argentina and other Latin American countries.  Singapore seems to be the only
11  The case  of a relatively  large  number  of workers  opting  out of thie  mandated  scheme  would  imply  a greater
role for tax-financed  pensions,  either  through  an explicit  public  pillar or through  means-tested  social  assistance
pensions. If the number  of opt-outs  was very large,  then the whole  rationale  of a mandatory  savings  scheme  would
need to be re-examined  since  in the face of strong  opposition  it would  be unlikely  to be effective.
12  Under  the proposal  to introduce  a compulsory  retirement  savings  scheme  in New  Zealand  that was turned
down in the referendum  of September  1997,  not only self-employed  workers  would  have  been required  to
participate  but contributions  would  have  been assessed  on investment  income  as well as on all types of
noninvestment  income,  such  as unemployment  benefits  or other  social  transfers  (New  Zealand  Government  1997).
13  In Switzerland,  contributions  to the public  pillar are assessed  on all employment  income  without  ceilings.
10country that allows for lower contribution rates for older workers who continue to work after
reaching the normal retirement age. This may be motivated by the high level of contribution
rates, the high cost of labor, and the low retirement income of many aged workers.
2.5  TAX TREATMENT
In analyzing the tax treatmnent  of retirement saving, a distinction is usually drawn between
regimes that exempt contributions and investment income but tax pensions (the EET regime) and
t]hose  that tax contributions but exempt investment income and pensions (the TEE regime).'  1
T  hese two regimes have different cashflow effects because of differences in the timing of tax
payments, but their long-term impact is the same.
Many countries use the TEE concept for compulsory social pension systems and the EET
approach for voluntary company or personal pension schemes, though some countries (e.g.
Switzerland) apply consistently the EET approach to both social and occupational pension
schemes.'5 It is also worth noting that there are countries with a TTE regime (New Zealand),
others with an EEE regime (e.g. Singapore) and still others with a TTT regime (e.g. Russia for
some pension schemes).
Most countries that operate an EET regime impose limits on the two Es.  First, upper
limits are placed on the rate of tax-exempt contributions that can be made to pension schemes.
Second, there is a ceiling on eligible earnings, although South Africa is notable for the absence of
any such ceiling.
With regard to the second E, most countries exempt investment income from income tax.
EBecause  the assets commanded by pension funds have increased dramatically in recent years,
some countries have imposed limits on the exemption of investment income.  In Denmark, this
takes the form of upper limits on real rates of return (i.e. any investment income in excess of a
specified limit of real returns is liable to tax, though returns from investments in equities are
exempt from this tax), while the Netherlands subjects to tax any investment income arising from
surplus assets in overfinded schemes. The Dutch approach makes more sense than the Danish
14  This  follows  the terminology  developed  by the London-based  Institute  of Fiscal Studies  in the 1970s. In
American  termninology,  the EET regime  is often  described  as the "IRA-type"  of taxation  and the TEE  regime  as the
"municipal  bond finance"  type of taxation.
15  Under its new pension system, Hungary proposes to apply the same tax treatment, consisting of a 25% tax
credit on contributions, exemption of investment income, and taxation of benefits, to all 3 pillars. A 25% tax credit
is equivalent to a constrained first "E".
11approach, although it faces the difficulty of identifying the level of overfunding, which can be
quite controversial in defined benefit schemes.16 Several countries, including Australia, South
Africa and Sweden, impose tax on investment income at a reduced rate.
Many countries also allow partial commutation of pension benefits into a tax-free lump-
sum so that pension benefits are only partially taxed.  Thus, one can realistically argue that the
tax regime is "eet" (i.e. lowercase rather than uppercase) in most countries.
An EET regime that provides tax exemption of contributions at the marginal tax rate
avoids the double taxation of retirement savings.  But it offers a tax deferral benefit that has
greater value for high income workers, the more progressive the scale of income taxation and the
greater the income disparity between active working and passive retirement life.  In this sense,
the EET approach can have a pronounced degressive impact and benefit high income workers
much more than low and middle income ones. To mitigate this problem, the tax exemption of
pension contributions could be limited to the basic rate of tax, thus eliminating the more
favorable treatment of high income workers. This is similar to the approach proposed for
Hungary.
But a more equitable soluiion that would also benefit nontaxpayers would be to
supplement tax exemption with a credit transfer system that would involve a direct government
contribution to the retirement saving accounts of low income workers.  It would represent a
government subsidy or a form of negative income tax linked to saving for retirement.1 7 A
government co-contribution is offered in the Czech Republic and Mexico and was also envisaged
in Australia. 18
The case for a government co-contribution can become stronger if account is taken of the
need to protect low income workers from the high operating costs of individual capitalization
accounts. Moreover, in countries such as Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Singapore,
Malaysia, etc. where workers show a strong preference for the receipt of lump sums on
retirement, a government co-contribution could be used as an incentive to encourage moving
away from the lump sum mentality toward proper annuitization.  Thus, three arguments can be
16  Davis  (1995)  offers  a more detailed  discussion  of the tax regime  in different  OECD  countries.
17  This  discussion  abstracts  from the merits  and demerits  of a consumption-based  tax system  that would  avoid
the double  taxation  of all types of savings. A goverr-nent  co-contribution  ito  the retirement  savings  accounts  of low
income  workers  could be combined  with  a consumption-based  tax system.
18  In the Czech  Republic  the government  co-contribution  has not been linked  to a minimum  saving  for
retirement  and  has encouraged  small  amounts  of savings  that  can be withdrawn  penalty-free  after  only 15 years. In
Mexico,  the govermnent  intends  to deposit  one peso a day  to each  retirement  savings  account,  even to high  income
workers. In Australia, payment  of the co-contribution  was scheduled  to be gradually  phased  out as incomes
reached  average  eamings  but the co-contribution  concept  is unlikely  to be implemented.
12used in favor of a modest and well targeted government co-contribution: to encourage
compliance, especially amnong  low income workers; to subsidize the high operating costs of low
balance accounts; and to induce a move away from the lump sum mentality (Vittas 1997). The
argument against is the budgetary cost.
Tax incentives have opportunity costs for the government and their use may be
ineffective if they lead people to shift their savings to tax-favored forms without any overall
increase in long-term savings. Moreover, visible tax incentives, such as the credit transfer
involved in a co-contribution scheme, would raise more objections than indirect, less visible
ones, like tax exemptions.  But despite these objections, there should be little doubt that properly
targeted tax incentives can be very powerful tools in encouraging compliance.
III.  REGULATIONS  AFFECTING  STRUCTURE  AND CONTESTABILITY
Private pension funds can be subject to many controls that affect the structure and
contestability of the sector. These controls include rules on authorized institutions, operational
controls such as the non-discrimination rule, and the regulation of fees and commissions.
3.1  TYPES OF AUTHORIZED  INSTITUTIONS
The question of which type of institution is authorized to offer pension services is related
to the nature of the mandate and the nature of benefit involved. It is different from the question
of the authorization criteria that an institution must meet to obtain a license once the structure of
the system is determined. There are clear links between the two questions since authorization
criteria vary depending on the types of institutions involved.  Authorization criteria have
prudential objectives and set out minimum capital, "fit and proper", and business plan
requirements, whereas the types of authorized institutions affect the structure of the market.
There are three types of institutions that may be authorized: corporate pension funds; specially
authorized independent pension funds; and ordinary financial institutions (such as banks,
insurance companies or mutual funds).
In countries where there is neither an employer nor a worker mandate for a "second"
pillar, employers are authorized to set up pension schemes on a voluntary basis provided they
rneet some basic scheme rules.  Corporate pension funds are operated as trusts, foundations or
rnutual associations.  They are legally separate entities and have to observe detailed rules
regarding governance and employee representation. In the United States, employers offering so-
called 401(k) plans must also set up a trust with fiduciaries and trustees, even if participating
workers are allowed to select from a number of authorized investment funds. Even though there
is growing outsourcing of the administration and investment functions of retirement plans to
independent specialized service providers, sponsoring employers continue to be responsible for
13complying with regulations imposed by the Department of Labor and the Internal Revenue
Service.'9
In countries with employer mandates, any employer cam  be authorized to establish a
pension fund, often in the form of a trust or foundation.  The trusts or foundations are managed
by boards of trustees that usually consist of employer and employee representatives.  The trustees
are responsible for selecting the asset managers and for running the pension fund, although
increasingly workers are given a limited choice of investment funds. There are minimum benefit
conditions that need to be observed, but otherwise employers may offer more generous benefits,
including defined benefit pensions.  There are also multi-employer pension funds, sometimes run
by trade unions, in industries that are characterized by high mobility and are extensively
unionized.  Small employers in sectors without multi-employer funds usually employ insurance
companies or other financial institutions to run their pension schemes. Thus, countries with
employer mandates such as Switzerland, Australia and Hong Kong (under the planned new
compulsory pension system), tend to authorize both corporate and independent pension funds.
Kazakstan, Hungary and Poland also provide for the co-existence of corporate and independent
pension funds.  With the likely emergence of hybrid mandates, this may become the norm in
future pension reform programs.
In Latin America, where the mandate is on individual workers, only specially authorized
institutions are allowed to operate pension funds. Except for B3razil,  corporate pension funds do
not play a central part in the pension system.  Banks and other financial institutions are usually
authorized to establish such specialized subsidiaries, often through a holding company in the
group, but other entities, such as trade unions and employer associations, may also do so.
In many countries, all workers, but especially those who do not participate in company
schemes, are encouraged by tax benefits to save for their retirement with existing financial
institutions.  These facilities are basically aimed at self-employed workers, who as already noted
are not usually covered by mandatory schemes. But voluntary schemes also encourage
retirement saving by all workers over and above the minimum compulsory level.
No special authorizations are required for voluntary saving of this kind.  Financial
institutions offering retirement accounts are not compelled to imaintain  segregated assets for these
accounts. Individual workers can place their retirement savings with banks, insurance
companies, or mutual funds and can have multiple accounts. They are responsible for making
investment decisions and for maintaining tax records.  However, financial institutions offering
19  401(k)  refers  to the section  of the Internal  Revenue  Code  that regulates  the requirements  that  must be
followed  to allow workers  to defer  tax by electing  to contribute  to qualified  regular  savings  plans. Section  403(b)
covers  regular  savings  plans  established  by tax-exempt  or nonprofit  entities. The basic  requirements  that company
retirement  plans must follow  to qualify  for special  treatment  under  the Internal  Revenue  Code are set out in section
401(a).
14tax-advantaged retirement savings accounts must report contributions and withdrawals to the tax
authorities. The Individual Retirement Arrangements (IRAs) in the United States, the Registered
Retirement Savings Plans (RRSPs) in Canada, and the more recently authorized Personal
Pension Plans in the United Kingdom follow this pattern.
Special authorizations create a segmentation in the market for financial services as only
some institutions are allowed to operate pension funds (Shah 1997). Although such
segmentation is undesirable in the long run, it may be necessary in countries with mandatory
pension pillars, especially where capital markets are less developed and most financial
institutions are subject to weak prudential regulation and supervision. But, as in the case of other
types of regulations, in the long run the types of authorized institutions should be expanded to
allow for greater integration of pension funds with other financial markets.
3.2  OPERATIONAL CONTROLS
Operational controls cover vesting, portability and funding requirements,  single or
multiple accounts or funds, and the non-discrimination rule.  They vary considerably between
worker and employer mandates and especially between defined contribution (DC) and defined
benefit (DB) plans.
The main controls on DB plans concern minimum vesting, portability and funding
requirements and the non-discrimination rule. DB plans involve one pension fund for all covered
employees and the issue of fund choice and multiple accounts does not arise.  The non-
discrimination rule is also relevant for DC plans, but vesting, portability and funding raise fewer
regulatory issues. For DC plans with genuine individual capitalization accounts, full vesting,
funding, and portability is the norm, although for each feature some limitations of secondary
importance may apply. The ability to have multiple accounts and to operate multiple funds has
emerged as a more controversial issue for DC plans with individual accounts.
In countries with voluntary company pension schemes, employers are required to meet
design rules that specify non-discrimination among workers. These can be very complicated and
burdensome. They imply similar contribution rates on employees and similar benefit formulas.
Because of abuses in the past, regulations also impose minimum vesting, portability and funding
requirements for DB plans.  These vary from country to country.20 Increasingly, the minimum
vesting period is 5 years or less.  Portability of vested benefits when workers change employment
is also increasingly required, although calculating the present value of such benefits is affected
by actuarial assumptions that tend to discriminate against departing workers.  Employers assume
the investment risk of pension fund assets, but adequate funding of actuarially assessed pension
20  For a more  detailed  discussion  of these  regulatory  issues  for advanced  OECD  and EU countries,  see Davis
(1995)  and de Ryck (1996).
15obligations is required in order to protect the interests of workers from the solvency risk of
sponsoring employers. Required funding levels have implications for the investment and asset
allocation policies of the pension fund, but they are also affected by the subjectivity of actuarial
assumptions.
Although far from perfect and watertight, these regulations on DB plans increase the
protection of worker rights and by implication raise the cost to employers of offering DB plans.
Coupled with the perceived declining stability of employment patterns, these tighter regulations
may explain the decline in the number and relative importance of DB pension plans in many
advanced countries.
In company-sponsored DC plans, employers used also to operate one fund for all covered
workers, but with the growing popularity of 401(k) plans, US companies now offer a limited
choice of funds and even individual instruments.  The investment risk is assumed by the workers,
but companies provide education and guidance to familiarize workers with market opportunities
and promote better informed investment decisions. Employers are, however, reluctant to offer
investment advice, because they may find themselves liable for losses.
In countries with employer mandates, which specify minimum benefits in the form of DC
plans, companies may operate one fund for all covered workers or they may offer limited choice
of investment fund.  Account switching may occur only when workers change employment,
although workers have the right to leave accumulated balances iin  the fund of their previous
employer.  As a result of this provision, many Australian workers have several pension accounts,
although only one active account. Vesting of employee contribuLtions  is immediate but vesting of
employer contributions may be deferred by a few years.  Funding and portability are virtually
full, as long as the plan is DC, while a non-discrimination rule is also imposed.
In individually arranged facilities, where individuals set up their own accounts, such as
IRAs in the United States and RRSPs in Canada, they may place their retirement savings in
several accounts and decide the allocation of their balances between accounts and funds on an
individual basis.  Holders of IRAs and RRSPs have traditionally invested heavily in bank
deposits and guaranteed return contracts offered by insurance companies (known as guaranteed
investment contracts in the US and guaranteed interest annuities in Canada), but in recent years
there has been a significant shift in favor of equities, including equity mutual funds (Poterba and
Wise 1996). Yet despite these positive developments, there is continuing concern about the
financial sophistication of most workers. 21
21  In the United  States,  market  surveys  of workers  participating  in 401  (k) plans report  a significant  gap
between  what  the participants  actually  know about investments  and  what they think  they  know. 55%  of participants
who  professed  knowledge  about  plan investments  misidentified  which  types  of investments  are typically  found in a
balanced  plan. Almost  50%  of participants  who said  they were specifically  knowledgeable  about  money  market
funds thought  that  money  market  funds contained  stocks  and bonds. More  than 75%  of participants  were wrong
16In Chile and most other Latin American countries with worker mandates, pension
regulations have imposed the "one account per worker" and "one fund per company" restrictions.
The rationale for these restrictions is to keep the system simple, to verify compliance, and to
encourage transparency.  They also reflect the perceived lack of financial sophistication of most
workers. The restrictions are supported with a uniform pricing rule that requires pension fund
management companies to treat all workers equally.  These rules have come under criticism from
observers of the Latin American pension reforms, although they seem to have followed prior
established practice in more advanced countries and to have been motivated by the need to keep
the system simple and safe.
The "one account per worker" rule forces workers to place all their pension savings with
onie  pension fund management company. Multiple accounts per worker would allow a
diversification of pension fund management company risk, although an unlimited number of
accounts would tend to complicate the verification of compliance (a major issue in most
mandated schemes).22 Allowing two or three accounts per worker may be a feasible compromise
solution, once the mandatory pillar and supervisory capacity are well established.
The main argument against multiple accounts is the likely increase in fees incurred by
workers, which would be high if flat fees to cover the fixed costs of setting up and maintaining
an account were applied.  The potential high cost of multiple account holding would induce most
workers with low balances to hold one or at most two accounts.  But high income and high
b'alance workers could maintain more than one account and thus reduce the intense marketing
e:fforts  that are made by selling agents to persuade them to switch their accounts.23 This is
because workers would be able to switch part of their contributions and/or balances and would
represent less of a prize for selling agents.
The "one fund per company" rule does not allow companies to offer funds that are
tailored to the different investment needs of young and old workers. In response to these
criticisms, Chile is currently considering the introduction of a second fund per company that
vvould  be wholly invested in fixed income securities and in which all workers within five years of
about the best time  to transfer  into a bond fund. Finally,  they made  serious  errors  about classifying  investment  risk
and identifying  current  and historical  levels  of inflation  (Franz  et al 1997:2.56).
2.2  The continuing  advance  of electronic  technology  suggests  that verification  of compliance  in the presence
cf multiple  accounts  should  be less  of an issue,  once electronic  reporting  is implemented.
23  The prohibition  of levying  management  fees  based on account  balances  in Chile and  Argentina  has meant
that high income rather than high balance workers are the most attractive targets for management companies and
their selling agents.  However, the intense marketing effort and the high level of account switching may also be
rnotivated by other factors (see below).
17retirement  would  be required  to invest in order  to  protect  the value of their balances  from the
greater  fluctuation  of equity  prices. In Mexico,  multiple  fund[s  may be offered  in the future.
Allowing  multiple funds  may, however,  create  some  problems. Companies  may
encourage  some  workers  (say senior executives)  to join the better  performing  funds and  they may
attempt  to manipulate  the allocation  of securities  among  different  funds. Ideally,  the allocation
of securities  must be effected  at the time the transaction  (purchase  or sale) is undertaken,  but
fund  managers  may fail to observe  this rule and may discriminate  in favor  of one or other  of the
funds  under  their management.  Another  argument  in favor  of the "one  fund" rule is that each
management  company  has to stand  behind  one product. Its reputation  and its business  are on the
line and its performance  is not obscured  by the offer of a wide range of funds  with differing
styles  and objectives.
The "one price"  rule prevents  pension  fund  management  companies  from offering
different  types  of discounts:  loyalty  discounts  to affiliates  who stay with the same fund  for long
periods;  group discounts  to workers  who participate  in a group?  contract  (peritaps  arranged  by
their employer);  volume discounts  to affiliates  with high incomnes  and/or  high balances;  and
"direct selling"  discounts  to workers  who  by-pass  selling  agents and open accounts  direct.
Although  motivated  by the desire  to protect low income  as well as less sophisticated  workers
from paying  charges  that are disproportionate  to their incomes,  the "one  price" rule may have
created  serious  distortions  in the competitive  environment  facing  management  companies.
By breaking  the link between  revenues  and costs,  the "one  price" rule may have
contributed  to the high marketing  intensity  of the sector,  the employment  of large numbers  of
aggressive  selling  agents,  the high level of account  switching,  and the high level of total
24 operating  costs (Arrau  et al 1993,  Valdes-Prieto  1995).  Account  switching  may  have emerged
as a substitute  mechanism  developed  by the market in order  to rebate  the excessive  fees charged
on high income  workers. Allowing  loyalty,  group and especially  high volume  and "direct
selling"  discounts  could  remove  these distortions  but it would  also imply abandoning  the "one
price" rule. Given  the legitimate  concern  to protect  low income  workers  from relatively  high
charges,  such  a regulatory  change  would  probably  require  the payment  of some  kind of subsidy
(government  co-contribution)  to low income  or perhaps  to low  balance  accounts.
24  The growth  of marketing  intensity  of the Chilean  scheme  is highlighted  by the increase  in  the share of
marketing  costs in  total operating  costs. This  grew  from 32% in 1982  to 37% in 1994  and to 48% in 1996. Valdes-
Prieto  (1994)  reports  data for 1990  and 1991  that show  that  marketing  costs  amounted  to about  25% of total
operating  costs. The subsequent  rise may have  been caused  by the entry  of several  new AFPs  in the early 1990s,
which  may,  in turn,  have been  induced  by the high  operating  margins  enjoyed  by AFPs  in 1990  and 1991.
According  to the data reported  by Valdes-Prieto,  the average  operating  margin  of pension  fund  management
companies  amounted  to 42% in 1991.
18Faced with an unexpectedly very high level of account switching (one in every two active
accounts in Chile and one in every three active accounts in Argentina after only three years of
existence), regulators have sought to impose structural restrictions on account switching.  In fact,
in Argentina the law allows only 2 account transfers per year (6 months of contributions are
required before an account can be transferred), while in Chile practical considerations effectively
limit account transfers to 3 per year.
Account switching grew very fast in Chile after 1988 when the process of switching
became less cumbersome and time consuming for workers.  This allowed selling agents to
initiate and complete the whole cycle of processing account transfers once they obtained the
signed consent of affiliated workers. Personal visits by workers to their AFP were no longer
required.  A similar approach is followed in Argentina where selling agents have been criticized
for misleading workers, obtaining their signatures on false grounds, and even counterfeiting
signatures.
To contain the level of account switching and thus discourage the high level of spending
on marketing and commissions to selling agents, several Latin American countries are
contemplating the imposition of more severe limits on account switching (one per year or even
per longer periods).  They are also thinking of requiring personal visits to pension fund
management companies in order to limit account transfers to only those workers who have strong
reasons for switching. These additional restrictions would, however, effectively lower the
operating efficiency of the system and could penalize workers who are unable to pay personal
visits to their pension fund management companies (older or disabled workers).
3.3  REGULATION  OF FEES AND COMMISSIONS
The apparent high level of operating costs in countries with worker mandates has implied
high levels of charges. As a large proportion of these costs originates in marketing and selling
costs, concern has been expressed that granting individual choice to workers to select fund
managers may lead inevitably to higher costs compared to a situation of delegated choice that is
found in countries with employer mandates (Arrau and Schmidt-Hebbel 1994, Diamond 1994).
The verdict on this must, however, await better data on operating costs in countries with
employer mandates.
Company-based pension schemes, whether mandated or voluntary, do not entail high
selling and marketing costs and do not involve direct charges on workers.25 This is one of their
25  To the extent  that employers  incur  costs in operating  pension  plans for their workers,  the latter  will pay in
the longer  run through  lower  wages  than they would  otherwise  receive. The  problem  with employer  mandates  is
that many of the costs are hidden  (failure  to charge  rent for the use of premises,  making  available  senior  staff for
administration  and investment  management  duties,  producirg  leaflets  and  other information  without  an explicit  cost
charge on the pension  fund, etc.). Hidden  costs  of this  kind may be particularly  important  at the launching  of the
19main advantages compared to independent funds based on worker mandates.  The main selling
and marketing costs that are incurred in company schemes are the promotional costs of insurance
companies and other financial institutions who seek to obtain the pension business of different
companies, especially in the case of multi-employer funds.  There are also promotional costs
incurred by asset managers, custodians, actuaries, auditors and other financial institutions serving
company pension schemes, while in the case of voluntary company DC schemes, there are
promotional costs incurred in seeking to increase worker participation and in offering investment
educational programs.  But all these costs pale into insignificance compared to the selling and
marketing costs incurred by pension fund management companies in worker mandates.
In employer mandates as well as in voluntary company-based schemes, there is little need
to regulate selling commissions and marketing costs, because the underlying market is one
between professionals with equal access to information and financial sophistication--the trustees
of pension funds deal directly with the managers of companies supplying different types of
services. The situation is vastly different in the case of worker mandates.  There, individual
workers, many of them financially unsophisticated and unfamiliar with the workings of financial
markets, deal with the managers of pension fund companies or, more likely, with the selling
agents retained by such companies. The need for regulating fees and commissions is thus much
greater.
In Chile, the authorities have not imposed any controls on the level of fees and
commissions, relying on competition (and presumably also on the threat of future regulation) for
putting a lid on them.  They did, however, regulate the structure of commissions, though only by
disallowing some types of fees. No controls have been placed on the level and structure of
commissions paid to selling agents. Authorized fees include a fixed (flat) fee and a pro rata fee
per collection (and per scheduled withdrawal when workers retire), fees for opening new
accounts (entry fees), and fees for voluntary savings accounts. No exit, asset-based (account
management) or performance-based fees are allowed.  Regular mnanagement  fees based on the
accumulated account balance were initially permitted but they had an adverse impact on
unemployed workers with inactive accounts and were subsequeintly  prohibited.  Exit fees are not
allowed because of concern that they might be set at high levels to discourage the transfer of
accounts.
The use of a flat fee per collection has a regressive impact on low income workers. The
differences in rates of return caused by this fee may be significant, especially when compounded
over 40 years.  Some pension fund management companies in Chile and other countries have
new  scheme  and  may  have  implications  for  the  sequencing  of  the  regulatory  structure  of mandatory  private  pillars.
For instance,  they  may minimize  start-up  costs  and favor  starting  with  an employer  mandate  based on corporate
plans  and limited  individual  choice  of investment  fund and  then gradually  moving  to independent  funds  and greater
individual  choice.
20used a high flat fee as a means of discouraging low income workers, while by charging a lower
volume fee they have sought to attract high income workers.  Other companies have eliminated
their flat fees or have allowed their real value to erode by not adjusting them fully to inflation.
Despite claims regarding the insulation from political risks of the new pension system (Diamond
1994), it is alleged that there has been considerable political pressure to lower or eliminate flat
fees because of their adverse impact on low income workers (Valdes-Prieto 1995).
The structure of fees has also been shaped by the "non-discrimination" rule and the
requirement to charge the same prices to all affiliated workers. This approach has so far
prevented pension fund management companies from offering loyalty, group, high volume, or
"direct selling" discounts.  Loyalty discounts have been allowed in Argentina, but their impact
on discouraging switching has been insignificant. As argued by Rofman and Bertin (1996),
loyalty fees tend to be small and may be ineffective in discouraging departing transfers.  What
could be more effective would be rewards paid to leaving workers to induce them to stay.
The fees paid to selling agents are based on commissions per new account.  Because of
the marketing intensity of worker mandated pension systems, the level of commissions is high
and the number of selling agents is also very large.26 Attempts to reduce commission levels and
to link agent commissions to the length of an account have not been successful so far because of
the market power and strong resistance of selling agents.
One way to cope with the high level of costs, the marketing intensity of the system and
the high frequency of account switching is to impose more restrictions on switching (see above),
to limit advertising or marketing efforts, or to control the level of fees and commissions.
However, before such interventionist initiatives are contemplated, consideration should be given
to liberalizing the structure of fees and commissions and use government subsidies of one form
or another to protect low income workers from the effect of unregulated prices that might have a
regressive impact.
Reintroducing asset management fees and reducing collection fees would be one option.
To protect workers who have already paid high collection fees, the example of US mutual funds
could be followed whereby workers are subject to different tariffs depending on when they
27 entered the system.  Analysis of the impact of different fee structures on workers and
26  The number of selling agents increased in Chile from less than 3,000 during the 1980s to over 15,000 in
the 1990s.  This rise was caused by the entry of 8 new companies in the early 1990s. Although the number of
companies has fallen back to 13, mostly as a result of mergers, the number of selling agents continues to be high
and, as already noted, marketing costs absorbed 48% of all operating costs in 1996.  Argentina and Mexico have
also suffered from very high numbers of selling agents.
27  US mutual funds have different classes of shares with varying pricing structures for the same funds: class
A shares involve a front-end load (collection fee); class B shares involve a regular load (12b-1 fee) plus a contingent
21management  companies  shows  that a management  fee based  on.  assets implies  a lower  cost for
workers  upfront  but a higher  cost in the long run. For management  companies,  a fee on assets
implies  a longer break-even  and  payback  period,  but greater  prcifits  in the long run, provided  the
level of fees is not reduced  by market  competition.  But for newly  created  mandatory  systems,
asset management  fees may  have to be very  high to ensure  that management  companies  do not
suffer  huge losses at the start  of the system.
Thus, starting  with collection  fees may  be the only practical  way of introducing  a
compulsory  system  based on a worker  mandate  and independent,  non-employer  pension  funds.
As the system  matures  and total balances  increase  in relation  to monthly  collections,  the
investment  management  and account  maintenance  costs are likely  to become  more important
than  the collection  and account  opening  costs. The structure  of fees is also likely  to change,
while  the regulatory  regime  itself may  need to adapt. Of course,  an alternative  way  to organize  a
compulsory  private  pension  pillar could  be to start  with an employer  mandate  and delegated
choice  of pension  fund and move gradually  to a hybrid  mandate  that allows  for individual  choice.
IV.  INVESTMENT  LIMITS,  MINIMUM  PROFITABILITY  RULES  AND STATE
GUARANTEES
Investment  limits,  minimum  profitability  rules and state guarantees  raise many
controversial  issues in pension  fund regulation. On  the one hand, there is a need  to protect
workers  from imprudent  behavior  by asset managers. But on the other  hand,  such rules tend  to
give  rise to moral hazard,  to stifle financial  innovation  and competition,  and  to constrain
investment  efficiency.
4.1  INVESTMENT  LIMITS
One of the most controversial  aspects  of pension  fund  regulation  is the use of strict
investment  rules,  not only in the newly created  compulsory  personal  pension  plans in Chile and
other  Latin American  countries  but also in many  OECD  countries,  especially  in continental
Europe  and Japan. The main criticism  is directed  at the prohibition  of, or low limits  on,
investments  in overseas  assets. But the low limits  on equities  and the tendency  to use pension
funds as captive  sources  for financing  government  budgets  or social investments,  such  as low
cost housing  and low interest  mortgages,  have also caused  concern.
deferred  sales load  (contingent  exit  fee). The CDSL  is usually  declining  and reduces  to zero. Class  C shares  are
offered  to employees  of brokerage  fees  and involve  no loads; class  D shares  involve  a level load, comprising  a
small  initial  load  and a continuing  12b-1  fee (Bogle  1994). It should  be noted that  these loads  usually  aim  to cover
distribution  costs (i.e. commissions  to stockbrokers).  They  are levied  on top of fund  expenses  for operating  and
investment  management  costs,  which  are deducted  from investment  returns. Companies  that do not charge  any
loads  tend  to make  higher  expense  deductions  than load funds.
22In some OECD countries, mainly Anglo-American ones, the "prudent person" rule has
traditionally been used.  This approach is now also spreading in other developed countries. This
rule requires managers to follow high fiduciary standards in investing the funds. It allows fund
managers to set their own investment guidelines and avoids the pitfalls of government direction
of funds and government interference with market processes and especially with financial
innovation.  There is mounting evidence that the investment performance of pension funds
operating under the "prudent person" rule has been superior to that of funds operating under
quantitative limits, even though such limits are often not binding (Davis 1997).
Despite its superior investment performance and its greater flexibility, the "prudent
person" approach has come under criticism in recent years, both because of its vagueness and
because of its tendency to cause uniform investment policies among pension funds and thus
contribute to the herding behavior that characterizes most institutional investors (International
Monetary Fund 1995). However, the vagueness of the "prudent person" concept may also be one
of its strengths and lies behind its flexibility.
In recent years, the meaning of the concept has been modified to require pension fund
trustees and asset managers to be more concerned with corporate governance in the companies in
which they invest.  In earlier periods, the concept implied that pension funds should exert
pressure on corporate management by selling the shares of poorly performing companies.  But  it
has increasingly been recognized that, with the growing dominance of institutional investors, the
"exit" option was no longer as liquid and easily used as before and pension funds needed to
exercise some "tvoice"  in corporate affairs. The new concept effectively requires pension funds
to cast their votes and also to support the creation of more efficient and responsive corporate
governance structures.
Another sense in which the "prudent person" concept has evolved is with regard to
investments in unlisted instruments.  Whereas in the past, investments in listed securities were
encouraged, now pension fund trustees seek investments in private equity that are more
profitable. Although investments in private equity have been subject to a relatively low limit, the
level has been rising in recent years and pension fund trustees haven been able to do so by
following average practice among most trustees.
The "prudent person" approach seems appropriate when employers operate DB schemes
and assume the investment risk of the funds. As long as the pension plans are adequately funded,
with top-up contributions from sponsoring employers if necessary, allowing investment policy
freedom to company-based pension funds would seem to cause few safety concerns.
In DC plans, however, relying on the "prudent person" rule may be less effective, as
workers assume the investment risk and may not have the information and expertise to monitor
23the investment performance of different funds. Investment rules need to be stricter under a
mandatory pillar in order to protect the large numbers of unsophisticated and inexperienced
investors who are forced to participate.
Investrnent rules, if applied, should emphasize profitability and safety. This means
allowing pension funds to seek the highest returns in the market, but requiring them to diversify
their asset holdings in order to avoid excessive concentration of risk.  It also means setting
maximum limits for permissible assets and avoiding setting minimum limits, since the latter
would imply a direction of funds.
Strict investment rules and even prescribed investments have long characterized the
investment policies of public pension funds. For instance, in Singapore and Malaysia, the
national provident funds, which mobilize large long-term financ.ial  resources equivalent to
between 40% and 70% of GDP, have until recently been required to invest most of their funds in
non-marketable government bonds. In Sweden, the ATP public pension fund has been required
to invest in government bonds as well as the bonds of mortgage credit institutions at interest rates
that were usually below market levels by a couple of percentage points.  In most countries with
partially funded social security systems, there has been a clear tendency to require investments in
government bonds, in constructing low cost housing units, and in providing low-interest housing
and other loans to participating workers.  Investment returns in many of these cases have been
well below market levels. As the various instruments carried fixed rates of interest, the funds
suffered from highly negative real rates of return when inflation rates got out of control.
The social security institution of Egypt suffered heavily from negative real rates of return
during the 1980s as did the national provident funds of most African countries and the partially
funded social security institutions of Latin American countries (WVorld  Bank 1994). In fact, the
negative returns earned on their reserves and subsequent erosion of their value has been one of
the main reasons for the historical transformation of social security systems from a partially
finded to an unfimded "pay-as-you-go" basis.  But strict investment rules and prescribed
investmnents  have also been imposed on private pension funds. A good example is provided by
South Africa, where both pension funds and insurance companies were subject to such
requirements before the late 1980s with adverse effects on their total returns.
Maximum limits on investment allocations have traditionally been imposed in
Continental Europe and East Asia and have also been extensively used by the reforming
countries of Latin America, Eastern Europe and Central Asia.28 The quantitative limits on
investments have rarely been binding as pension fund trustees have tended to adopt more
2B  However,  Bolivia  and  Uruguay  amnong  Latin  American  countries  require  the private  pension  funds  to invest
in government  bonds in order  to finance  the fiscal  cost  of the transition.
24conservative investment policies than those permitted by the rules.  This has long been true of
pension funds in continental European countries (e.g. Switzerland, the Netherlands and
Germany) but it has also been observed in Chile and Argentina.  This conservative approach may
be explained by a low level of risk tolerance by pension fund trustees and a major pre-occupation
with the so-called "shortfall" risk, by the incentive structure facing pension fund managers, and
by lack of familiarity with equity and overseas markets (International Monetary Fund 1995).
This implies that calls for more liberal investment rules could be toned down, although the
presence of tight investment limits may delay the progressive adaptation of investment policies
by pension fund trustees.
Another problem with investment limits is that they may fail to achieve the desired
amount of investment diversification. While they avoid excessive concentration of risks, they
cannot ensure appropriate diversification.  For instance, a regulated pension fumd  could invest in
bonds and bank deposits within the prescribed limits but fail to invest in equities.  Imposing the
principle of adequate diversification without specified upper limits may in fact be more effective
in achieving the objective of prudent diversification.
Investment rules are set at three different levels, the first two of which are not as
controversial as the third. The first level refers to the type of instruments that are eligible.
Ideally, investments should be effected through organized exchanges and in listed, highly rated,
and actively traded securities.  Any exceptions should be subject to clearly stipulated limits.
Loans to members should be avoided, even if they are subject to low limits compared to
accumulated balances.  This is because pension funds may have difficulty in charging market
rates of interest on such loans and in ensuring their timely repayment.
Similarly, direct investments in nonlisted and/or low rated assets should be discouraged,
although indirect investments in such assets through the use of securitized instruments, such as
mortgage-backed securities for housing loans and venture capital funds for investments in new
firms and infrastructure projects, could be encouraged. The rules regarding highly rated and
actively traded securities should prohibit placing funds with insolvent banks and should require
any transactions with related parties within financial conglomerate groups to be effected at
market terms and conditions.
The second level relates to imposing clear limits on exposure to individual issuers of
securities.  For example, holding of equities or bonds of any one issuer are usually limited to 5%
or 10% of the total assets of the fund or 5% or 10% of the total value of securities of a given
issuer.  This limit avoids excessive concentration of risks and close involvement with any one
company.  A higher limit might require a pension fund to become involved in board
representation and managerial control. In general, it is better for pension funds to exert voice and
control in corporate affairs through collective bodies.  The 5% or at most 10% limit is usually
applied with particular force to securities issued by the sponsoring employer of a fund.
25There is also usually a limit on borrowing and pension find  leverage. Borrowing is
permitted for short-term liquidity purposes and for enabling the execution of transactions and
may be subject to a low limit of not more than 10% of the value of assets. Long-term borrowing
and leveraging through the use of derivatives is prohibited.
These two types of investment rules are found in most countries and as already indicated
are not particularly controversial. Even if not imposed by regulations, they are likely to be set by
the internal guidelines set by pension fund trustees.  The limit on investments in the securities of
sponsoring employers and on borrowing are also found in the AuLstralian  mandatory pension
system, which otherwise follows a relaxed regulatory approach, emphasizing protection from
fraud, theft and negligence but no other state guarantees.
The third level of investment rules has to do with limits on risk classes of assets. One
fundamental problem of these rules is that assets belonging to a lparticular  class may exhibit
different risk characteristics. For instance, a five-year government bond is a very different risk
instrument from a zero-coupon thirty-year government bond.  Similarly, an equity stake in a
newly-created high technology company has different risk/reward characteristics than the equity
of a mature utility company.  These differences in risk characteristics imply a more refined
application of rules.  After all, investment guidelines issued voluntarily by pension fund trustees
to asset managers would need to draw a distinction between large cap and small cap equities as
well as between high and low grade debt instruments.
Objections to the use of limits on risk  classes of assets should be softened if account is
taken of the need of pension funds to invest in balanced portfolios and of the growing trend
toward passive indexation among pension funds in Anglo-American countries.  Critics of limits
should not confuse the investment policies pursued by diversified and balanced pension funds
with those that are more appropriate for specialized mutual funds.
Investment rules setting maximum limits on different classes of assets appear to have
worked reasonably well in countries like Chile.  To be effective, such rules must be flexible and
revised in line with the growing maturity of pension funds (Vittas and Iglesias 1992). Thus, any
limit on equity investments should be revised upwards as the pension funds grow in size and
become more mature and the capital markets are modernized and become more efficient.
A perennial question facing regulators of pension funds is whether to allow investments
in overseas securities. The argument in favor of overseas investm,ents  is to permit a
diversification of country risk and also to seek suitable investments for the placement of
available funds. The argument against is that allowing investments overseas would deprive the
domestic markets from valuable long-term financial resources and would thus weaken the
modernizing influence that pension funds may have on the domestic markets.
26The issue of limits on overseas investments has attracted exaggerated attention, at least
insofar as the mandatory private pension funds of developing countries are concerned. Pension
funds in developed countries have shown a clear "home bias" in their investment allocations and
have usually stayed well within officially imposed limits.  Even pension funds operating in
countries that have adopted the "prudent person" approach have also exhibited a strong "home
bias" (International Monetary Fund 1995, Reisen 1997).
A workable compromise would be to allow overseas investments once accumulated
pension fund assets reach a given percentage, say 10% or 20% of GDP.  This limit is clearly
arbitrary but it allows a certain maturing of pension funds and provides an outlet if domestic
iinvestment  opportunities do not respond to the greater availability of institutional funds.
Investment in overseas assets is often handicapped by the lack of familiarity of foreign
securities by local managers.  This, plus the high transaction costs in establishing managerial
relationships with foreign asset managers, probably explain why most pension funds stay well
within their permitted limits.  Authorizing domestic mutual funds that specialize in foreign
securities may facilitate pension fund investments in overseas assets as it would overcome the
need for specialist managers and the lack of locally available information on the prospects of
foreign securities.  Allowing the use of hedging instruments to guard against currency risk would
also be essential.
Overseas investments are clearly more important for smaller countries, especially those
that depend on a few industries that may in turn be dominated by a few family firms.  The lack of
suitable domestic instruments is usually a very strong argument for permitting investments in
overseas securities.  It should, however, be emphasized that the potential contribution of pension
reform might not be realized if pension funds are allowed to invest freely in overseas securities.
Faced with the need to develop acceptable domestic instruments, the authorities may
undertake other economic reforms.  A "holistic" approach to economic reform is often
emphasized. This should cover not only capital market and fiscal reforms but also a break-up of
existing family cartels and an opening to foreign direct investment and strategic foreign entry.  If
foreign multinationals are encouraged to list their local subsidiaries and joint ventures, they
could engender a substantial increase in the domestic supply of suitable securities.
4.2  VALUATION RULES
Valuation rules vary considerably from country to country, depending on whether
pension funds are voluntary or compulsory and whether they are based on worker or employer
mandates.
27In countries with worker mandates where pension funds operate on mutual fund
principles, valuation rules require assets to be "marked-to-market" on a daily basis.  Using listed
securities through organized exchanges facilitates market valuation. For assets that do not trade
on organized exchanges (such as real estate), pension funds could be required to use a valuation
model developed by the supervision agency. Such models could be based on the traditional
"moving average" valuations used by accountants for nontradedl  assets.
Although market values are subject to continuous, and sometimes large, fluctuations,
using them is better than book values which may result in large deviations from the true value of
various assets and the creation of hidden reserves.  If reserves are to be used for smoothing out
large fluctuations in market values, they should be set up in an open and transparent manner, as
in the case of the profitability fluctuation reserves that are used in the pension fund systems of
Chile and other Latin American countries.
To minimize the valuation problems caused by assets that are not actively traded on
organized exchanges, investment rules could prohibit direct holdings of such assets or could
subject them to very low limits.  Investment rules could encourage instead use of traded
specialized investment funds (such as real estate investment trusts, venture capital funds, or
infrastructure funds) to facilitate indirect investments in such assets.  Use of specialized mutual
funds could also be advocated as a means of offsetting the natural bias of pension funds to invest
in the securities of the state or large corporations.  The financing;  of small finns, new ventures
and large infrastructure projects could be greatly encouraged through such vehicles.
Valuation rules are less clear-cut in countries with company-based DB plans.  Pension
funds in the US and the UK are allowed to use values derived from actuarial models that
discount future income streams instead of market values. Perhaps no major harm is caused by
this approach since these valuations are used for calculating the adequacy of funding levels, an
exercise that also takes into account the actuarially calculated present value of future liabilities.
When workers transfer to other companies and join other pension funds, the value of their vested
benefits is also actuarially calculated. However, the situation is different in DC plans where
there is a greater tendency to use market values.
In Hungary and other Eastern European countries, what might be referred to as the
"savings account" principle is used (Vittas 1996). This requires the use of book values and the
crediting to individual accounts of income received and realized capital gains.  Income accrued
but not received and unrealized capital gains are not allowed to be taken into account.  This
approach would tend to generate hidden reserves and to complicaLte  account transfers.
Market practitioners as well as regulators are concerned that use of market values in
undeveloped capital markets that suffer from low trading volumes and lack of depth and liquidity
may cause excessive volatility in reported returns.  A temporary solution to this problem would
28be to use written up or written down values, especially for government bonds which may be held
to maturity. This approach, plus recognition of accrued but not yet received income, would go a
long way toward correcting reported returns.  However, the longer-term objective should be to
use market-value accounting.
4.3  MINIMUM PROFITABILITY RULES AND STATE GUARANTEES
A mandatory "second" pillar implies a stronger obligation on the authorities to ensure that
the system is simple, fair and safe.  Minimum profitability rules and state guarantees aim to
protect small and unsophisticated investors, not only from fraud and manipulative exploitation by
pension fund managers, but also from large disparities and fluctuations in retums.
Minimum profitability rules can take many different forms.  They can be set in absolute
terms and be expressed in nominal or real terms.  Or they can be set in relative, nominal or real,
terns  by reference to the average for all pension funds. And they can be set on annual, calendar
or rolling, basis, or they can cover a longer period. The less onerous for the pension funds, and
by implication less beneficial for workers, are minimum levels set in nominal terms for the
whole active life of a worker.  The most onerous is the offer of a guaranteed minimum real rate
of return on an annual basis.
Minimum profitability rules vary considerably among countries.  In most OECD
countries, where funded pension schemes are still voluntary, there are no rules on minimum rates
of return, even when the pension funds operate as DC plans and workers assume the investment
risk.  However, insurance companies and commercial banks offer what are known as "guaranteed
investment contracts" and "guaranteed deposit contracts" that promise a minimum nominal rate
of return, usually set at half or less the prevailing nominal rate on safe one-year government
securities.
In Switzerland, which has a mandatory "second" pillar, a minimum annual nominal rate
of return of 4% is imposed on the funds. Expressing a minimum return in nominal terms is not
very satisfactory. It can be very costly if inflation is very low, and especially when prices are
falling, and it is meaningless when inflation is out of control. Singapore also has a guaranteed
nominal rate of return of 2.5%. There is also a risk that the minimum rate of return may become
a "norm" and induce fund trustees to adopt conservative investment policies.
Expressing the minimum rate of return in real terms would provide more meaningful
protection to individual workers, but it would not be advisable as it could expose a guarantee
fund to large payments in years when stockmarkets register negative real returns.  The fiscal cost
of a guaranteed real rate of return could be prohibitive.
29Chile and other Latin American countries (though not Mexico) have opted for
guaranteeing relative rates of return. Pension fund management companies are required to make
up any shortfall in retums if these fall below the average return for the sector by a specified
percentage.  In Chile, the minimum rate of return, which is expressed in real terms, is equal to
50% of the average return, while in Argentina, where it is expressed in nominal terms, it is equal
to 70% of the average.  (For symmetric purposes, any returns in excess of 150% of the real
average in Chile or 130% of the nominal average in Argentina are placed in a profitability
fluctuation reserve.) In both countries, the rule is applied on a 12-month rolling basis.
Pension fund management companies are expected to make up any shortfalls in returns
by using first the profitability fluctuation reserve, if one has been created, and then their
investment reserves (encaje). If these are exhausted, the companies are required to provide new
equity to make up any remaining shortfall and reconstitute their investment reserves.  If any
company fails to make up the shortfall and refuses to provide additional equity from external
funds, it is liquidated, the government makes up any remaining shortfall, and the workers transfer
their accounts to another company of their choice.
Minimum relative profitability rules tend to cause pension funds to follow uniform
investment policies, as small funds cannot afford to deviate too much from the investment
profiles adopted by the large companies. To respond to this criticism and allow more flexibility
in investment policies, the Chilean authorities are considering changing the application of the
rule to a 36-month rolling basis.  Given that pension contracts are long-term contracts that can
span up to sixty years, moving from an annual to a three-year, or even a five-year, guarantee
would still provide adequate effective protection to affiliates.
The criticism that investment policies become uniform under a minimum relative
profitability rule is sometimes exaggerated.  Even without such a rule, pension funds tend to
bunch their investments in similar instruments.  The rationale for such herding behavior by
pension funds seems to be twofold: on the one hand, pension fund trustees, following the
"prudent person" rule, tend to adopt similar asset allocation policies; and, on the other, asset
managers are reluctant to underperform the market since the price for underperformance may
well be the loss of business.  The growing use of indexing and passive investment management
also contributes to more uniform asset portfolios. A minimum relative profitability rule would
protect investors from aberrant fund managers, without necessarily causing inefficiencies in
investment policies.
This issue remains unresolved. One alternative to minimum relative profitability rules,
which could have more appeal in advanced countries, would be to require management
companies to spell out clearly their investment policy at the beginning of each year and to be
liable for making up any shortfalls that might result from deviating from this policy.  The use of
benchmark portfolios and detailed investment guidelines may be a better approach to the current
30situation in developed countries where the only constraint facing fund management companies is
the loss of business and the potentially adverse impact on their reputation. However, these
penalties would occur after the event and would offer no consolation to retiring workers who
may have suffered large losses from the failure of fund managers to comply with their own
investment guidelines.
Statements of Investment Policy Objectives (or SIPOs) will be required from pension
find trustees under the mandatory pension system that is being introduced in Hong Kong, while
a clearer indication of investment strategy is required under new UK pension legislation.
Presumably, fund trustees and asset managers who deviate from these objectives will be subject
to sanctions.  But no country has yet imposed a liability on pension fund trustees or asset
managers to make up any shortfall in returns that may result from their failure to comply with
their declared objectives. This may be explained by the practical difficulty of defining
benchmark portfolios, ascertaining their implied rates of return and determining the deviation
from the stated policy objectives and the shortfall in returns.  However, fimd trustees and asset
managers could be held liable for gross violations of their stated objectives, while standardized
forms for SIPOs could be developed by regulatory authorities if the use of benchmark portfolios
was considered beneficial.
Minimum profitability rules raise the question of state guarantees. In Chile and other
Latin American countries, the government is responsible for making up any remaining shortfall
in guaranteed returns after the liquidation of a failed pension fund management company.
Offering this guarantee implies the creation of a strong and effective supervision agency to
ensure that pension fund management companies comply with the rules, do not take excessive
risks, and maintain the equity reserves needed to support their operations.  In Switzerland, and
also in some Eastern European countries, a guarantee fund set up by the association of pension
funds and supported by a compulsory assessment on all pension funds provides a first line of
defense before calling on the government to bail out the members of failed pension funds.
But apart from guaranteeing the minimum relative profitability of pension funds, the
authorities may also need to guarantee annuity payments for old age pensions as well as for term
life (survivors) and disability pensions of failed insurance companies (if these insurances are
offered by private companies).  Upper limits may be imposed on the amounts of these
guarantees, but especially in mandatory systems where benefits are required to take the form of
monthly pensions (rather than lump sum payments), such guarantees are essential.  Annuity
payments subject to specified limits are guaranteed in both Chile and Argentina. The
government stands behind these guarantees but insurance companies are tightly regulated and
supervised to ensure that they have adequate reserves and to minimize the likelihood of
insolvency.
31V.  CONCLUDING  REMARKS
One way to conclude this paper is by contrasting the relaxed regulatory approach that
would be entailed in a system based on the "prudent person" rule with the alternative more
draconian approach.
The basic elements of a relaxed regulatory regime would entail:
*  Voluntary participation or at most a hybrid mandate.
*  A high degree of individual choice.
*  No special authorizations for participating institutions.
*  Ability to hold multiple accounts.
*  Ability to operate multiple funds, with individual choice of investment fund.
*  Ability to differentiate in pricing policies and to offer loyalty, group or high volume
discounts.
*  Ability to levy any type of fee (entry, exit, account maintenance, asset based, etc.) and to
offer loyalty and group discounts.
'T  &Application  of "prudent person" rule on investments with no detailed investment limits.
*t  Freedom to invest in overseas securities.
No minimum profitability requirements and no state guarantees other than against fraud.
In contrast, the draconian approach might entail:
*  Worker mandate.
*  Some individual choice (e.g. in changing management company).
*  Special authorizations.
One account per worker.
*  One fund per company.
*  One pricing rule.
*  Regulation of types of fees (though not of the level).
*  Detailed rules on investments (but with maximum limits to avoid concentrations of risks).
*  Prohibition or low limits on investments in overseas asselts.
*  Minimum relative profitability requirements.
*  State guarantees for profitability shortfalls.
32Countries with well developed capital markets and with long traditions of voluntary
company-based pension plans would aim to adopt the more relaxed regulatory regime.  To
ensure effectiveness of the "prudent person" rule, such countries would emphasize programs to
educate trustees on their fiduciary responsibilities and on developing systems for ensuring proper
understanding and control of the risks involved. Even if they impose mandatory participation
they could exempt workers with strong philosophical objections.  Similarly, if they impose
investment limits and minimum profitability requirements, they could allow workers who do not
wish to benefit from state safeguards and guarantees to invest in less heavily regulated fimds.
In contrast, countries that start with underdeveloped capital markets and with little or no
history of private pension funds would do well to adopt the more draconian regulatory approach.
But they would also be well advised to relax the regulatory regime as private pension funds and
their affiliated workers gain in experience, sophistication and maturity.
All countries, however, should adopt regulations of  a prudential and protective nature
such as the compulsory use of custodial services, professional asset management, actuarial
reviews and external audits. They should also prescribe asset segregation and minimum levels of
capital backing as well as extensive information disclosure and, last but by no means least, they
should develop a system of effective supervision. One of the weaknesses of employer mandates
is the lack of adequate disclosure and the dearth of meaningful data on the investment
performance and cost efficiency of funds. This is particularly the case in Switzerland but it is
also a problem in most countries where company-based pension schemes proliferate (whether
voluntary or compulsory).
The Chilean model has recently come under strong criticism (Shah 1997) because of its
high marketing intensity and high operating costs and because of its draconian regulations and
the uniformity of asset portfolios. However, much of this criticism is exaggerated. It contrasts
the Chilean experience with a counterfactual that is highly unrealistic. Even in countries with
well developed capital markets and a long tradition of private pension funds, portfolios tend to be
uniform for the reasons discussed above. Although there may be greater uniformity in Chile and
other Latin American countries, the cost of such greater uniformity has not been clearly
established.
33Similarly, integrating the pension system into the pre-existing financial system may not
be a feasible option in countries where existing banks and insurance companies may be insolvent
and inefficient, where existing regulatory agencies may be ineffective, and where mutual funds
and other modem capital market institutions may be conspicuous by their absence.  Creating
specialized pension funds supervised by a specialized regulatory agency may even have a
positive demonstration effect on the rest of the financial systeml  and may contribute to its
modernization and growth.  Experimentation with more relaxed regulations would be highly
desirable in order to mitigate the adverse impact of some of the more draconian regulations.  But
outright criticism of the Chilean model would not be justified.  There are many improvements
that can be made at the margin, such as using hybrid mandates and allowing some differential
pricing with proper safeguards to protect the position of low inc  ome workers, but there is little
need for a completely different approach to systemic pension reform in developing countries. A
strong regulatory approach is needed for ensuring simplicity and transparency, for gaining public
acceptance, for offering adequate safeguards, and for avoiding am  early failure of the reform
program.
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